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Re-thinking “the different perspectives that can be used when eliciting preferences in health” 
Aki Tsuchiya (Sheffield) and Verity Watson (Aberdeen) 
 
Abstract 
The 2003 Health Economics paper by Dolan, Olsen, Menzel and Richardson on “An inquiry into the 
different perspectives that can be used when eliciting preferences in health” presents a conceptual 
framework of six perspectives along two dimensions: preferences (personal, social, and socially 
inclusive personal) and context (ex ante and ex post).  The paper has been influential in setting the 
scene for empirical work which aims to elicit a social preference.  The objective of our paper is to re-
think this framework.  Building on examples using monetary and non-monetary valuations (i.e health 
state valuation), we ask a few key questions: who is the beneficiary of the health improvement (i.e. 
the user)?  Who pays for it (i.e. the payer) ?  Who decides and in what capacity (i.e. the assessor)?  Is 
there a correlation between the probabilities for people to become ill?  These questions refine the 
preference and context dimensions, and identify perspectives not classified by the original 
framework.  We propose an extended framework with 20 possible perspectives and present 11 of 
these formally to clearly distinguish between them. 
 
1. Introduction 
The paper “An inquiry into the different perspectives that can be used when eliciting preferences in 
health” (Dolan et al, 2003 – hereafter, the “DOMR” paper taking the initials of the four authors) 
presents a conceptual framework of six perspectives along two dimensions: preferences (personal, 
social, and socially inclusive personal) and contexts (ex ante and ex post):   
“The framework has two dimensions. The ﬁrst concerns whom the respondent is asked to 
think about. It could be that the question is concerned with: (i) the respondent herself, in 
which case she is being asked for her personal preferences; (ii) people other than the 
respondent, thus eliciting her social preferences, or (iii) both the respondent and other 
people, which involves the elicitation of her socially inclusive personal preferences. The 
second dimension concerns the relative point in time at which the preference is elicited and, 
as a result, the degree of certainty associated with the need for health care. It could be that 
there is uncertainty about whether or not health care will be needed in the future (referred 
to as the ex ante context) or it could be that it is known that health care is needed now 
(referred to as the ex post context).” (DOMR, p.546; emphases in original) 
The paper has been influential in setting the scene for empirical work on social value judgements 
that compares across interventions for different patient groups, and typically aims to elicit a social 
preference (for example, Gyrd-Hansen, 2005; Pinto-Prades, Abellán-Perpiñan, 2005; Schwappach, 
2005; Dolan, Tsuchiya, 2009 – also see Gaertner, Schokkaert, 2012).  However, the framework is 
intended to apply to many different kinds of preference elicitation exercise, including monetary 
valuation of a statistical life, and health state valuation. 
The objective of our paper is to critically reassess the framework, and to illustrate its imprecision 
and incompleteness. First, along the preference dimension the DOMR framework defines the move 
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from the personal to the social perspective in terms of who becomes ill and not who bears the cost 
of treating the illness or in what capacity the respondent assesses the alternatives (and the 
framework is therefore imprecise). The roles of the respondent as user, payer and assessor should 
be defined clearly in the preference elicitation task.  Furthermore, the DOMR framework does not 
allow for non-use or proxy preferences (and is therefore incomplete).  Second, along the context 
dimension, the DOMR framework operationalises the context (i.e. ex post  and ex ante) with respect 
to the timing of events, and does not allow for no uncertainty in the ex ante context (and is 
therefore incomplete).  Moreover, the framework introduces risk in the social preference scenario 
without reference to the independence of the probabilities, in other words how the risk to one 
person might or might not be related to the risk to another person (and is therefore imprecise).   
Instead, this paper distinguishes five preferences (personal, non-use, proxy, social and socially 
inclusive personal) and four contexts (one of which is ex post and three ex ante).  Of these 20 
possible perspectives, the paper focuses on 11.  We will first set the context to ex post, and examine 
the five preferences, using examples in monetary valuation (contingent valuation: CV) and non-
monetary health state valuation (time trade off; TTO). Then we move on to examine the ex ante 
context, where we focus on only two personal and four social preferences using CV scenarios – but 
the points made also apply to the other preferences and to TTO.  Throughout, stylised scenarios are 
used as examples to illustrate a given perspective.  These are made up of the following components: 
- Who is to have the illness 
- When they are ill – and if not yet ill, the probability of becoming ill 
- What the payment numeraire is: money or years of life 
- Who is making the sacrifice  
Across the 11 preferences, the paper introduces  22 stylised scenarios (and eight more in the 
appendix).  These are not intended as templates for preference elicitation questions to be used in an 
actual survey but as illustrations to convey the differences between the different perspectives from 
which preferences can be elicited.  The 22 scenarios are summarised in two tables: Table 1 presents 
15 ex post CV and TTO scenarios and Table 2 presents seven ex ante CV scenarios. 
 
2. The ex post personal, social, and socially inclusive personal preferences 
The first re-think concerns the preference dimension and focuses on the ex post context.  The DOMR 
paper distinguishes the personal and the social preferences with reference to two kinds of 
probability: pp, which is the probability of one’s own, personal, need for treatment; and po, which is 
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the probability that others in society will need treatment.  DOMR sets out that an ex post personal 
perspective requires pp = 1 and po = 0, while an ex post social perspective requires pp = 0 and po = 1.  
 
2.1. The ex post personal perspective 
The welfare effect of change in health can be measured using compensating surplus (Freeman, 1993). 
This builds on the concept of compensating variation, but does not involve changes in relative price 
and therefore is applicable to non-market goods like health.  (Similarly, equivalent surplus 
corresponds to equivalent variation.)  A CV study can elicit the change in income that cancels out the 
welfare effect of improved health from an ex post personal perspective – viz. compensating surplus.  
Here is the example to illustrate the essence of this perspective:   
(1)  “Imagine you and only you currently have condition X: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you are willing to pay for a complete cure and be no worse off than in the 
current situation?”  [ex post personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
The objective of the CV scenario is to identify the level of Δyi that, given Δhi and holding everything 
else constant, equalises the utility of two prospects so that:  
ui
i
(yi,hi
X
) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
X+Δhi),  
where ui represents the utility function of individual i; the superscript i indicates that it is as assessed 
by i; yi represents income of individual i; hi
X
 represents health of individual i in condition X; hi
X+Δhi is 
assumed to represent recovery to full health; and assumes utility is an increasing function of income 
and of health. 
From scenario (1) we can distinguish three roles that a respondent needs to take on to 
answer such personal preference scenarios in a rational manner: (a) the person who benefits from 
the treatment (the “user”) indicated by the subscript to h; (b) the person who pays for the treatment 
(the “payer”) indicated by the subscript to y; and (c) the person who arbitrates and decides, whose 
preference the scenario elicits (the “assessor”) indicated by the superscript to u. In scenario (1), all 
three roles are assigned to “you”, the respondent, represented by i.  In any scenario, the assessor is 
always assigned to the respondent, while the user and payer roles need not be. 
An ex post personal TTO scenario that corresponds to (1) can be represented as: 
(2) “Imagine you and only you currently have condition X: what is the maximum number of 
years of life in full health that you are willing to give up for a complete cure and be no 
worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post personal TTO: user = you; payer = you; 
assessor = you] 
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Health state valuations typically use “health state X” and specify a duration separately.  However, 
we use “condition X” of no specified duration for comparability with CV, and for two pragmatic 
considerations: if health state X is specified for for 10 years, then the alternative cannot be a 
“complete cure” (a complete cure should not only achieve full health but also full life expectancy 
given current age); we do not specify duration at any level because later example scenarios become 
contrived (e.g. when user ≠ payer). 
Using the same formula above, this time, y represents years of life; and h represents health 
related quality of life.  (Actual implementation of a TTO elicitation task will require the specification 
of a multiplicative utility function between duration and health related quality of life.)  The objective 
of the TTO scenario is to identify the size of Δyi that equalises the utility of two prospects captured 
by the formula, given Δhi and holding everything else (including income) constant.   
As in (1), the user, payer and assessor roles are all assigned to the respondent.  In practice, it is 
likely that po is left unspecified, so that while “you" currently have X, the respondent is not told if 
they are the only person with X.  Indeed, provided it is clear that “you” as the payer are only paying 
for a cure for “you” as the user, then po = 0 is not necessary to elicit a personal preference using CV 
or TTO. 
The wording of scenarios (1) and (2) does not exactly match the formula.  The formula neutrally 
equates two outcomes, one with relatively high y and low h, and another with relatively low y and 
high h, without indicating how these outcomes occur.  The verbal scenarios, on the other hand, 
indicate that “you” are invited to give up something of value (-Δyi) in exchange for a complete cure 
(+Δhi).  In order to make the hypothetical scenarios mimic an actual market transaction, CV studies 
tend to favour such “exchange-based” wording.  Arguably exchange-based wording, especially in 
health state valuation studies, may be susceptible to bias because it may invoke loss aversion or 
regret minimisation.  With this caveat, we will continue to use exchange-based wording in our 
stylised scenarios, because it better facilitates the distinction between the user, the payer and the 
assessor roles than more neutral wording. 
The DOMR framework indicates that social preferences are elicited by changing the probabilities 
to pp = 0 and po = 1, so that the respondent is no longer the user.  However, this is not sufficient to 
achieve a social perspective.  For example: 
(3)  “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to pay for 
a complete cure for those who have X and be no worse off than in the current situation?”  
[ex post personal non-use CV: user ≠ you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
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ui
i
(yi,hj
X
) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hj
X+Δhj), i ≠ j 
This somebody else (j) may be one person, or more.  Everything else (such as i’s health or j’s 
income) are assumed to stay constant.  In (3) the user role has been separated from the 
respondent (subscript j for h), while the payer and assessor roles remain with the respondent 
(subscript i for y, and superscript i for u).  Although this elicits a preference about outcomes for 
others (and hence is not personal), the preference itself is personal. Scenario (3) has similarities 
with the elicitation of “non-use values”.  Non-use values concern goods, for example, in a remote 
location that the respondent does not benefit from the use of directly.  The valuation of non-use 
values separates the user and assessor roles; but not the payer and assessor roles.  When the 
objective of the exercise is to estimate a non-use value in the form of individual compensating (or 
equivalent) surplus, then it is necessary that the payer role remains with the assessor role as in 
scenario (3).  If the objective is an individual compensating surplus, then this is still a personal 
preference, not social preference, even if pp = 0 and po = 1.  
While typical examples of non-use value are found in environmental economics (e.g. the 
value of saving habitat in the arctic for polar bears), it is also possible to find examples in health.  The 
term non-use value is hardly used in health economics, but such a scenario would elicit caring 
externalities.  For instance, a woman may be asked for her willingness to pay towards treatment of 
prostate cancer, or a person living in the developed world may be asked for his willingness to pay 
towards treatment of diseases that are only prevalent in the developing world.  The key point is that 
it is possible to specify pp = 0 and po = 1 to elicit a personal non-use value. This is a perspective not 
included in the DOMR framework.   
A TTO equivalent to (3) would look like this: 
(4) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum number of years of life in full health that you are 
willing to give up for a complete cure and be no worse off than in the current situation?”   
[ex post personal non-use TTO: user ≠ you; payer = you; assessor = you; same formula as 
scenario (3)] 
This may appear extraordinary or even contrivied, because the nature of the payment numeraire 
(years of own life) requires the respondent’s life to be shortened in exchange for a complete cure 
for a stranger.  However, people sacrifice their own health in order to improve the health of 
others (e.g. live organ donors) - so the difficulty may be in the certainty of the TTO scenario rather 
than the numeraire (a Standard Gamble may feel less extraordinary). 
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Scenario (3) suggests that a social preference requires further separation of the payer role 
from the assessor role.  But even that is not sufficient.  The below scenarios separate the payer 
and assessor roles but keep the user and payer roles together: 
(5) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you think they are willing 
to pay for a complete cure for themselves and be no worse off than in the current 
situation?”  [ex post personal proxy CV: user ≠ you; user = payer ≠you; assessor = you] 
uj
i
(yj,hj
X
) = uj
i
(yj-Δyj,hj+Δhj) 
 
(6) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what is 
the maximum number of years of life in full health that you think they are willing to give up 
for a complete cure for themselves and be no worse off than in the current situation?”   
[ex post personal proxy TTO: user ≠ you; user = payer ≠ you; assessor = you; same formula 
as scenario (5)] 
Here, the respondent as assessor is asked for their view (superscript i for u) on a factual matter: 
the other person’s own personal preference or wellbeing (uj).  It is another perspective with pp = 0 
and po = 1 that is not included in the DOMR framework: this might be called proxy judgements, 
and it falls short of social preferences.  The example illustrates that to build a social preference, 
the user and payer roles need to be separated from the assessor and each other. 
 
2.2. The ex post social perspective 
A scenario for an ex post social perspective might look like this: 
(7) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum amount of money that society can pay for their complete cure 
and be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post social CV: user ≠ you; payer ≠ 
you; user ⊂ payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
As in (3) to (6) the user is somebody else (n ≥ 1), and separated from the assessor.  While the 
scenario asks the respondent to assess (“what do you think”), the party who is assessed to be no 
worse off is not the respondent in person (so it is not a personal preference) but society (of N 
individuals), who is the (immediate) payer.  Since society is made up of (and funded by) individuals, 
the users are likely to be a subset of the payers.  Scenarios like this are typically motivated by asking 
the respondent to imagine themselves as an officer authorised to make such decisions on behalf of 
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the population: in other words, the scenario represents a social welfare function rather than an 
individual utility function.  Such choices concern normative views on how society should operate – 
social value judgments – and can involve interpersonal comparisons and/or evaluation of fairness.  
Such judgements require a detached impartial perspective, which translates to the separation of the 
assessor role from the user and payer roles. Thus, the objective of the social CV scenario is to 
identify the size of the aggregate willingness to pay, ΣNΔyj, that equalises the social welfare of two 
prospects:  
W
I
[u1(y1,h1
X
), …, un(yn,hn
X
), un+1(yn+1,hn+1
F
), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] = W
I
[u1(y1-Δy1,h1
X+Δh1), …, un(yn-
Δyn,hn
X+Δhn), un+1(yn+1-Δyn+1,hn+1
F), …, uN(yN-ΔyN,hN
F
)],  
where j = 1, …, N; I ≠ j; ∂WI/∂uj >0; and ∂
2
W
I/∂uj
2
 ≤ 0. 
W
I represents social welfare, as assessed by an impartial decision maker I, and defined as a function 
of the utility of individuals.  The assessor, or superscript, of individual utility is deliberately left open.  
Welfarism defines social welfare as a function of individual utility as assessed by the individual 
themselves, uj
j; while non-welfarism uses individual utility, or welfare, as assessed by the decision 
maker, uj
I.  The scenario is akin to a transfer from the healthy to the ill within society in a social 
welfare programme (where the ill themselves may also contribute).  Note that the above (even the 
welfarist version) is not an aggregation of individual valuations of condition X captured by (1), and 
does not assume that uj(yj,hj
X
) = uj(yj-Δyj,hj
F
) holds for each j.  It does not assume that individuals 
pay the same amount, either.  Because of these, it may be difficult for a respondent to conceptualise 
aggregate willingness to pay (ΣNΔyj) as a measure of treating n cases of X. 
A TTO scenario may look like this: 
(8) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of years of life in full health that society as a whole are 
willing to give up for a complete cure for this group and be no worse off than in the 
current situation?”  [ex post social TTO: user ≠ you; payer ≠ you; user ⊂ payer; assessor = 
you as decision maker; same formula as scenario (7)] 
The difficulty of conceptualising ΣNΔyj may be even greater for TTO, since the idea of a total 
number of years of life given up by society as a whole is unique, and may be confusing especially if 
the number of people in the payer group (N) is much larger than the number of people in the user 
group (n): e.g. suppose N = 50 million and n = 100; it may not be immediately obvious that, for 
example 1 minute multiplied by 50 million people amounts to 10 months multiplied by 100 people.  
An alternative approach to scenarios (7) and (8) might be to exclude the users from the pool of 
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payers, and to match the number of people in the user group and the payer group (m).  Thus, for 
CV: 
(9)  “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum amount of money that another group with the same number of 
people (m = n) in full health can give up for a complete cure for the first group and society 
to be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post subgroup social CV: user ≠ you; 
payer ≠ you; user ≠ payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
And, for TTO: 
(10) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of years of life in full health that another group with the 
same number of people (m = n) can give up for a complete cure for the first group and 
society to be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post subgroup social TTO: 
user ≠ you; payer ≠ you; user ≠ payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
The objective here is to identify the size of ΣNΔyj that equalises the social welfare of two 
prospects (N > n + m): 
W
I
[u1(y1,h1
X), …, un(yn,hn
X
), un+1(yn+1,hn+1
F), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] = W
I
[u1(y1,h1
X
+Δh1), …, 
un(yn,hn
X
+Δhn), un+1(yn+1-Δyn+1,h n+1
F), …, un+m(yn+m-Δyn+m,hn+m
F
), un+m+1(y n+m+1,h n+m+1
F), …, 
uN(yN,hN
F
)] 
As with scenario (7), the assessment by the respondents concerns WI: i.e. whether society is no 
worse off.  
 
2.3 Person trade off and budget pie applications 
If the numeraire of scenario (10) is changed to the number of lives this will result in a variant of 
the person trade-off scenario (PTO; Patrick et al, 1973; Murray, Lopez, 1997): 
(11) “Imagine a group of n people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of lives in full health (m) that another group of people 
can give up for a complete cure for the first group and society to be no worse off than in 
the current situation?”   [ex post subgroup social PTO: user ≠ you; payer ≠ you; user ≠ 
payer; assessor = you as decision maker; same formula as scenarios (9) and (10)] 
The objective of the PTO scenario is to identify the size of the second group (m ≤ n) that equalises 
the social welfare of two prospects in the formula immediately above, but where yj-Δyj now 
9 
 
indicates being dead (notwithstanding hj
F).  Some variants of the PTO do not compare condition X 
against full health, but against another condition (Nord, 1992).  This would generate the relative 
value of one condition against another.  An actual PTO will contrast treating one group versus the 
other and a PTO scenario that builds on the framing of the preceding scenarios (in terms of 
compensating surplus) might look like this:   
(12) “Imagine a group of n people who currently have condition Xn: what do you think is the 
maximum size (m) that another group of people who acquire condition Xm can be if the 
first group is completely cured and society is no worse off than in the current situation?”  
[ex post subgroup social relative PTO: user ≠ you; payer ≠ you; user ≠ payer; assessor = 
you as decision maker] 
The respondent is in neither group.  The objective here is to find the number m that would 
equalise the social welfare of two prospects, given n and where N ≥ n + m: 
W
I
[u1(h1
Xn), …, un(hn
Xn
), un+1(hn+1
F), …, uN(hN
F
)] = W
I
[u1(h1
Xn
+Δh1
n), …, un(hn
Xn
+Δhn
n
), 
un+1(h n+1
F
-Δhn+1
m), …, un+m(hn+m
F
-Δhn+m
m
), un+m+1(h n+m+1
F), …, uN(hN
F
)] 
Here, hj
Xn
+Δhj
n
 equals hj
F, and yj is assumed to be constant throughout and therefore dropped. 
Note that these examples of PTO elicit compensating surplus, where the tasks equate a health 
state improvement for group n with a reduction in health state or life years for group m. These 
are different from typical PTO tasks in the literature that elicit equivalent surplus, by equating 
health state improvements for one group with health state improvements for another group of a 
different size with a different health condition, instead.  
In relative PTO tasks, the two groups can differ in terms of non-health characteristics (e.g. social 
class) alongside, or instead of, health.  Furthermore, when cost per person is assumed to be the 
same across the two groups, the scenario becomes very similar to a “budget pie” task that asks 
respondents to allocate a finite health care budget across competing treatments, to elicit their 
relative values.  An actual budget pie scenario will be framed in terms of the proportion of resources 
allocated to one treatment over the other, and thus of the number of people to be treated from 
each group (n + m = constant).  But a (somewhat contrived) budget allocation scenario that is framed 
to match the PTO formula above might look like this: 
(13) “Imagine there are two groups of people of equal size who currently have conditions Xn 
and Xm respectively, which cost the same per patient to treat, and not enough resources to 
treat everybody: what do you think is the combination of the number of people from each 
group to treat that would make treating either group equally good for society?” [ex post 
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subgroup social budget pie: user ≠ you; payer ≠ you; user ≠ payer; assessor = you as 
decision maker; same formula as scenario (12); n + m = constant] 
If a respondent perceives the budget pie task as one where a choice is made between two 
competing health improvements to one group versus another group, then this would elicit an 
equivalent surplus.  If the respondent, instead, perceives the task as one where a reduction in 
health improvement for one group is compensated by an increase in health improvement to the 
other group, then the task will elicit a compensating surplus. 
The last two scenarios (12) and (13) illustrate that in a social scenario, when the user and the 
payer are separate, the trade-off need not be across two different goods (viz. money vs health; or 
survival vs health related quality of life) and can be across the same good (health) of different people, 
which allows the comparison between the social value of a unit of health to one group relative to 
another. 
 
2.4. The ex post socially inclusive personal perspective 
The DOMR paper states that in a socially inclusive personal perspective, “an individual is asked to 
consider her own self-interest as well as the interests of others” (p.546).  The example in Menzel 
(1999) explicitly instructs the respondent to consider “both your own self-interest and what you 
think is best collectively” (p.264). Here is an ex post scenario that adapts scenario (7): 
(14) “Imagine a group of n people including you currently have condition X: what do you think 
is the maximum amount of money that society can pay for a complete cure and be no 
worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post socially inclusive personal CV: users ∋ 
you; payers ⊃ users; assessor = you as an individual and as a decision maker] 
Under the socially inclusive personal perspective, the assessor is one of the users, and the users are 
a subset of the payers as in (7).  The DOMR framework assumes that responses to the fully personal 
(1) and fully social (7) will differ and the response to (14) will lie between these two.  Menzel (1999) 
makes a contractarian case for socially inclusive personal preferences:   
“consent to particular policies – and willingness to be bound by them – is unquestionably an 
important positive step in the achievement of a sense of fairness in making decisions with 
enormous negative repercussions for selected individuals. In an area of life where the stakes for 
an individual or family can be as high as they are in health care, and where moral struggle can be 
wrenching, consent can provide badly needed credence for any policies that emerge from it.” 
(pp.264-265) 
The implication is that responses to scenario (1) representing ui
i can be too self-centred while 
responses to scenario (7) representing WI can be too uncommitted, and therefore scenario (14) has 
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the best hope of striking the right balance.  So, it may be possible to represent scenario (14) by 
introducing a relative weight (α) to capture this balance between scenarios (1) and (7): αWI[uN]+ (1-
α)ui
i.  But within a range from α = 0 (identical to ui
i) to α = 1 (identical to WI), there is no guidance on 
what value this relative weight should take.  A serious problem with this approach is that unless 
responses to (1) and (7) are also elicited from the same respondents, there will be no way of gauging 
the relative weight (α) that each respondent gives self-interest and interests of others in (14). 
A non-monetary valuation scenario using TTO from a socially inclusive personal perspective might 
be built from (14) and(8), and look like this: 
(15) “Imagine a group of n people including you currently have condition X: what do you think is 
the maximum number of years of life in full health that society as a whole can give up for a 
complete cure for your group and be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex post 
socially inclusive personal TTO: users ∋ you; payers ⊃ users; assessor = you as an individual 
and as a decision maker] 
The points made for (14) apply to (15). 
Note that subgroup scenarios such as (9) to (13) are not possible in an ex post socially inclusive 
personal perspective, because in order for the assessor to be able to contrast the benefits to the 
user and the costs to the payer without bias, she needs to be a member of both the user group and 
the payer group, while scenarios (9) to (13) do not allow this as they separate out the user group 
from the payer group. 
 
3. The ex ante personal and social preferences 
Let us now move on to the context dimension and examine the ex ante context under personal, and 
social preferences.  For simplicity, all the scenarios in this section are for CV tasks. The seven ex ante 
scenarios discussed in this section are summarised in Table 2.  (For non-use and proxy CV scenarios 
and TTO scenarios, see the Appendices.)  When a future prospect needs to be assessed, this can be 
done either before the event on the basis of expected outcomes (ex ante), or after the event with 
respect to the realised outcomes (ex post).   
In the below we distinguish four “cases”, where each is illustrated using an example involving N 
individuals (none of whom are currently ill), and expected patient numbers of n = pN. DOMR 
distinguishes the ex ante and the ex post with reference to “the relative point in time at which the 
preference is elicited” (p.546) and imposes uncertainty. We extend the framework by adding case 1, 
an ex ante context with no uncertainty. DOMR also introduces risk of illness in a population without 
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reference to the independence of probability of illness across members of the population. Cases 2-4 
below illustrate three possible probability correlations. 
Case 1: n known individuals will become ill and the rest will remain healthy; this might be 
thought of as a set of n cards each with an individual’s name on it – there will be n patients for 
certain who are known beforehand but not yet ill; 
Case 2: randomly selected n people from N will become ill and the rest will remain healthy; here, 
there is an envelope containing N cards, where n of them are marked for illness, and each of the 
N individuals takes a draw, with no replacement (i.e. a card that is drawn is not put back in the 
envelope) – ex post there will be exactly n patients, although it is not known ex ante which 
individuals it will be; 
Case 3: each of the N individuals have an independent probably p of becoming ill or otherwise 
remaining healthy; this time individuals take a draw from the above envelope, with 
replacement (i.e. a card that is drawn is put back in the envelope) – ex ante the expected 
number of patients is n, while the number ex post will follow a binomial distribution B(N,p) with 
mean of n; 
Case 4: with probability p all individuals will become ill; otherwise all individuals will remain 
healthy; just one draw is taken from the same envelope for the whole group – ex ante the 
expected number of patients is n, while ex post it will be either zero or N, and never actually n. 
Case 1 involves no uncertainty.  Cases 2 and 4 are examples with fully correlated probabilities of 
becoming ill (with negative and positive correlations).  Of course, there can be further, intermediate 
cases.  Case 3 is an example where the probabilities of becoming ill are entirely independent.  In all 
cases the ex ante expected outcome is n patients, while the ex post outcome ranges from: n (cases 1 
and 2); a distribution with mean n (case 3); and zero or N (case 4).  Examples corresponding to the 
first and third cases were discussed by Diamond (1967) and re-visited by Broome (1982): expected 
utility theory cannot distinguish between cases 2, 3, or 4.   
 
3.1. The ex ante personal perspective 
Let us apply the four cases to the personal perspective, involving just one individual.  Assuming 
individuals are selfish and are not affected by the health of others, a personal version of these four 
cases, from individual i’s perspective, reduces to: 
Case Ia: individual i will not become ill – as far as i alone is concerned, there will be no illness; 
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Case Ib: individual i will become ill – as far as i alone is concerned, there will be one patient (i) 
for certain; 
Case II: with probability p individual i becomes ill; otherwise i remains healthy – the expected 
number of patients is p, although ex post it will either be one or zero, and never actually p. 
Case Ia is not of interest (the individual will not become ill so the willingness to pay will be zero).  
The distinctions between cases 2, 3, and 4 are not meaningful in a single-person scenario, since in all 
cases the individual faces a probability of illness of p.   
In case 1 (Ib) there is no uncertainty – so this would not be ex ante in the conventional sense. 
However, the DOMR paper distinguishes ex-ante and ex post contexts with respect to the timing of 
events. To follow this, it is possible to set CV (and TTO) scenarios before the event, with no 
uncertainty.  A scenario for case Ib might look like this: 
(16) “Imagine you are about to develop condition X with certainty: what is the maximum 
amount of money that you can pay now to ensure a complete cure in the future when you 
become ill and be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and facing the 
condition)?”  [ex ante case I personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
 ui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
-Δhi+Δhi) 
For simplicity, we ignore time preference.  For an ex ante scenario to be meaningfully distinct from 
the corresponding ex post scenario, it is necessary to assume that cure is available only if payment is 
made now.   
Introducing uncertainty, a case II ex ante personal CV scenario might look like this: 
(17) “Imagine you will develop condition X with probability p: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you can pay now to ensure a complete cure in the future if you become ill and 
be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case 
II personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
pui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi,hi
F
) = pui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
-Δhi+Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
) 
The answer, or the size of Δyi, in (17) will depend on: the value of Δhi; risk aversion or the shape of 
the utility function (ui); and the subjective interpretation of probability p.  In other words, by 
contrasting (17) with (16), the effect of people’s aversion to risk and perception of probabilities can 
be examined.  But if the objective is to value Δhi alone, then an ex ante preference would be 
confounded. 
Scenarios that describe developing the condition and having it cured are cumbersome, and it is 
not obvious that respondents will assume ui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi+Δhi) = ui
i
(yi,hi
F
).  Therefore, although the 
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DOMR paper only uses curative examples, it is more realistic to use a preventative intervention to 
operationalise the ex ante context with uncertainty: 
(18) “Imagine you will develop condition X with probability p: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you can pay now for a complete prevention and be no worse off than the 
current situation (not paying and facing the condition)?” [ex ante case II prevention 
personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
pui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi,hi
F
) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
) 
However, preventative and curative scenarios have different welfare economic interpretations.  
The objective of the preventative scenario (18) is to identify the size of the payment (-Δyi) that 
equalises the utility of two future prospects shown, given the size of the potential health loss (-
Δhi) and keeping everything else constant. In this scenario, the user is not yet ill and the 
willingness to pay task elicits an equivalent surplus of avoiding the health loss (-Δhi), a bad, which 
makes two mutually exclusive outcomes equivalent: to keep the money and experience the 
illness; or to pay for the prevention and not experience the illness.  This is in contrast to curative 
scenarios, where the user is or will become ill and the willingness to pay task elicits a 
compensating surplus for the health gain (Δhi), a good, which makes the value of two things 
cancel out: the benefit of the cure and the cost of paying for it.  Welfare economic theory predicts 
that the compensating surplus (variation) of a good and the equivalent surplus (variation) of a bad 
will agree1. 
 
3.2. The ex ante social perspective 
Similarly to the personal perspective, it is possible to build CV (or TTO) scenarios set before the 
event but involving no uncertainty.  These would represent case 1.  Following the DOMR paper, let 
us go back to curative scenarios.  An ex ante social CV scenario with no uncertainty can build on the 
ex post social CV (7), and might look like this: 
(19) “Imagine  a group of n already identified people will develop condition X with certainty: 
what do you think is the maximum amount of money that society can pay now for a 
complete cure for this group in the future when they become ill and be no worse off than 
in the current situation?”  [ex ante case 1 social] 
                                                          
1
 In both cases, respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) is elicited. Either the WTP for the good or the WTP to 
avoid the bad. This is different from the literature that compares WTP and willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA), which compares the compensating and equivalent variation of either the same good or the same bad. 
For instance, by comparing WTP for the good, and WTA for not receiving the good. 
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W
I
[u1(y1,h1
F
-Δh1), …, un(yn,hn
F
-Δhn), un+1(yn+1,hn+1
F), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] = W
I
[u1(y1-Δy1,h1
F
-
Δh1+Δh1), …, un(yn-Δyn,hn
F
-Δhn+Δhn), u n+1(yn+1-Δyn+1,h n+1
F), …, uN(yN-ΔyN,hN
F
)] 
Since the scenario concerns n known individuals, anonymity is violated.  Thus, (contrary to 
convention) the subscripts j identify unique individuals. 
Ex ante social perspective scenarios can be built in three different ways corresponding to 
cases 2, 3 and 4, all of which have n = pN expected patients.  Under case 2, there will be pN (=n) 
patients with certainty, although it is not known beforehand who these will be.  So while there is 
uncertainty at the individual level, there is no uncertainty at the social level. 
(20)  “Imagine a proportion p of N people will develop condition X: what is the maximum 
amount of money that society can pay now to ensure a complete cure for this group in the 
future if they become ill and be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and 
facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case 2 social] 
W
I
[u1(y1,h1
F
-Δh1), …, un(yn,hn
F
-Δhn), un+1(yn+1,h n+1
F), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] = W
I
[u1(y1-Δy1,h1
F
-
Δh1+Δh1), …, un(yn-Δyn,hn
F
-Δhn+Δhn), u n+1(yn+1-Δyn+1,h n+1
F), …, uN(yN-ΔyN,hN
F
)] 
Note that this formula is the same as the one for scenario (19), but while scenario (19) violates 
anonymity (because the identities of the individuals matter), scenario (20) does not (and therefore 
individual identity is ignored).  Since anonymity means that the j subscripts in (20) do not represent 
specific individuals and at the social level individuals are interchangeable, scenario (20) has no 
uncertainty in terms of overall outcomes – there will be n ill peole for certain – and therefore this 
can be used to elicit aversion to inequality in outcomes, in the absence of risk at the societylevel. 
Under case 3, the health outcome will follow a binomial distribution with a mean of pN.   
(21) “Imagine N people are susceptible to develop condition X each with independent 
probability p: what is the maximum amount of money that society can pay now for a 
complete cure for this group in the future if they become ill and be no worse off than the 
current situation (not paying and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case 3 social] 
W
I
[ pu1(y1,h1
F
-Δh1) + (1-p)u1(y1,h1
F), …, puN(yN,hN
F
-ΔhN) + (1-p)uN (yN,hN
F
) ] = W
I
 [pu1(y1-
Δy1,h1
F
-Δh1+Δh1) + (1-p)u1(y1-Δy1,h1
F), … puN(yN-ΔyN,hN
F
-ΔhN+ΔhN) + (1-p)uN(yN-
ΔyN,hN
F
)] 
Here, expected social welfare is expressed as a function of expected utility of individuals.  As with 
(7), this does not assume puj(yj,hj
F
-Δhj) + (1-p)uj(yj,hj
F
) = puj(yj-Δyj,hj
F
-Δhj+Δhj) + (1-p)uj(yj-
Δyj,hj
F
) for each individual j, or that individuals pay the same amount.  The response to such a 
scenario will depend on: the value of Δhi; the shape of the social welfare function (W
I); and the 
respondent’s subjective interpretation of probability p.  The shape of the social welfare function 
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can represent risk aversion, inequality aversion, or both, but since both kinds of aversion result in 
diminishing marginal social welfare in individual utility, the two cannot be distinguished from each 
other using scenario (21). 
Under case 4, the expected number of patients is pN, but ex post, there will be either zero or N 
patients, and never pN (= n).   
(22) “Imagine that with probability p everybody (N) will develop condition X; otherwise 
everybody will remain healthy: what is the maximum amount of money that everybody in 
this group can pay now for a complete cure for themselves in the future if they become ill 
and be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante 
case 4 social] 
pW
I
[u1(y1,h1
F
-Δh1), …, uN(yN,hN
F
-ΔhN)] + (1-p)W
I
[u1(y1,h1
F), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] = pW
I
[u1(y1-
Δy1,h1
F
-Δh1+Δh1), …, uN(yN-ΔyN,hN
F
-ΔhN+ΔhN)] + (1-p)W
I
[u1(y1-Δy1,h1
F), …, uN(yN-
ΔyN,hN
F
)] 
This scenario can be used to elicit social-level aversion to risk, in the absence of (ex post) inequality 
across individuals. 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
In this paper we critically reassessed the DOMR conceptual framework of the perspectives that can 
be used to elicit preferences in health. The DOMR framework has influenced empirical work on 
social value judgements, but a conceptual framework of perspectives is important for all preference 
elicitation research and not just for social value judgments. In this paper we show that the DOMR 
framework is imprecise and incomplete in both the preference dimension and context dimension. 
We present an expanded conceptual framework consisting of five preferences and four contexts, 
and illustrate 11 of these in detail.  These are accompanied by22 stylised scenarios to illustrate the 
key features of each.  
In the preference dimension, the DOMR framework defines the difference between a 
personal and a social perspective based on who is or becomes ill. We show that individuals can take 
three roles in a preference elicitation task: the user (the person who is/becomes ill); the payer (the 
person who bears the cost alleviating the illness); and the assessor (the person who arbitrates and 
decides). We show that it is possible to elicit personal preferences when the user is not the payer or 
assessor, and the preferences elicited would measure caring externalities. We also present a 
scenario in which personal-proxy assessments could be elicited when the user and payer roles are 
separated from the assessor. Given this, we propose two more preferences to add to the three in 
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DOMR: the non-use and the proxy. We show that social preference should be defined with respect 
to who the assessor is (you as a private individual versus you as a decision maker), and not with 
respect to who the user is.  At the extreme, at least in theory, it is possible to conceive of a social 
scenario where “you as a private individual” have condition X and “you as the decision maker” are to 
assess society’s willingness to pay to treat the condition (while in practice, this would be susceptible 
to obvious bias).   
In the context dimension, the DOMR framework differentiates between ex ante and ex post 
contexts using the future events that occur with probability p that is strictly less than 1. This does 
not allow for future events that occur with certainty, which we now include.  Moreover, in the 
DOMR framework with social preferences the independence of probabilities between groups is not 
defined. We extend the framework to distinguish between three risky cases within the ex ante 
context: where individual outcomes are drawn with no replacement so that the ex post number of ill 
people is exactly n with no uncertainty (but with inequality across N); where individual draws are 
independent (dwawn with replacement) so that the ex post outcome follows a binomial distribution 
with mean of n where the outcome is uncertain and unequal; and where one outcome is drawn for 
the whole group so that the ex post outcome is uncertain (either 0 or N) but with no inequality. This 
extended framework thus highlights the perspectives that are necessary if the researcher wants to 
elicit inequality aversion (scenario (20)) or (social) risk aversion (scenario (22)).  When an ex ante 
social elicitation task is not specific enough to indicate which case of uncertainty is intended, it is 
arguably most likely that respondents assume independent probabilities (case 3; scenario (21).  This 
is where the two types of aversion are confounded, and in the DOMR framework it was not clear 
how these would affect ex ante social preferences.  
The extended framework will facilitate comparisons across empirical studies with more 
clarity at the conceptual level, by classifying studies into one of 20 preferences.  Equally, this can be 
used to guide the design of empirical studies.  Our extended framework could help researchers to 
have the most appropriate framework for their research question. The framework provides a set of 
roles the respondent can be asked to take and clarifies the role of risk in an ex-ante context. It 
should also be noted that the framework does not cover all the practical features of an actual 
scenario.  For example, it does not refer to payment vehicles (e.g. out of pocket or insurance 
premium in CV; or TTO or SG in heatlh state valuation), or routing and ordering (double bounded 
dichotomous choice or bidding game in CV; ping pong or titration in TTO), framing effects or other 
sources of bias. These other issues have alreadyreceived extensive attention in health economics, in 
particular in the CV literature (Smith, 2003; Hackl and Pruckner, 2005; McNamee, 2010; Luchini and 
Watson, 2013; Ternent and Tsuchiya, 2013). 
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O’Brien and Gafni (1996) present a conceptual framework for contingent valuation studies 
and focus on the five considerations for contingent valuation studies to ensure that the elicitation 
task is consistent with cost benefit analysis (CBA). Several of the considerations they identify are 
reflected in our extended framework. O’Brien and Gafni (1996) and Gafni (1991) question whether 
ex-post elicitation of service user’s personal preference is appropriate when CBA of a collectively 
funded health care service should take account of all benefits to society. O’Brien and Gafni (1996) 
identify both non-use values and option values as preferences that are omitted if only ex-post user 
personal preferences are elicited. Our extended framework includes non-use preferences in our 
extended set of preference dimensions. Further, our extended ex-ante context dimension allows for 
option values and our treatment of risk includes the uncertain outcomes identified by O’Brien and 
Gafni (1996).  
Recent years have seen increased interest in applying the evaluation methods used for 
health care to public health interventions (Edwards et al, 2013). Public health programmes aim to 
have a range of outcomes that need to be valued when the programme is evaluated. Within these 
are several that require elicitation perspectives not covered by DOMR. Public health programmes 
have spill-over effects on on individuals not targeted by the programme and therefore require the 
elicitation of non-use preferences. Many public health interventions include equity considerations 
and require elicitation of inequality aversion in outcomes. Public health programmes are often 
preventative rather than curative.  Our extended framework has better coverage to accommodate 
these applications. 
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Table 1: Summary of ex post preference scenarios  
preference user payer trade
(b) CV(c) TTO PTO BP  
Personal you 
you 
ac
ro
ss
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
go
o
d
s 
(1) (2)   ui
i
(yi,hi
X
) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi, hi
X+Δhi) 
Non-use 
≠ you 
(3) (4)   ui
i
(yi,hj
X
) =  ui
i
(yi-Δyi, hj
X+Δhj), i ≠ j 
Proxy user (5) (6)   uj
i
(yj,hj
X
) =  uj
i
(yj-Δyj, hj
X+Δhj) 
Social ∌ you 
society (7) (8)   WI[u1…n(yj,hj
X
); un+1…N(yj,hj
F
)] = W
I
[u1…n(yj-Δyj,hj
X
+Δhj); un+1 … N(yj-Δyj,hj
F
)]  
(d) 
subgroup 
(9) (10) (11)  
W
I
[u1…n(yj,hj
X
); un+1…N(yj,hj
F
)]  
= W
I
[u1…n(yj,hj
X+Δhj); un+1…n+m(yj-Δyj,h j
F
); un+m+1…N(yj,hj
F
)] 
same   (12) (13) WI[u1…n(hj
Xn
); un+1…N(hj
F
)] = W
I
[u1…n(hj
F
); un+1…n+m(hj
Xm
); un+m+1… N(hj
F
)]  
(e)
 
SIP(a) ∋ you society different (14) (15)   αWI[u1…N]+ (1-α)ui
i 
a) SIP: Socially inclusive personal;  
b) Trade: “across different goods” money and health (CV) or survival and HRQOL (TTO); “same” trading same good (across different people) 
c) CV: Contingent valuation; TTO: Time trade off; PTO: Person trade off; BP: Budget pie 
d) WI[u1…n(yj,hj
X
); un+1…N(yj,hj
F
)] is a shorthand for WI[u1(y1,h1
X), …, un(yn,hn
X
), un+1(yn+1,hn+1
F), …, uN(yN,hN
F
)] 
e) m + n = constant, for (13) 
 
Table 2: Summary of ex ante CV scenarios(a) 
preference user payer cur/pre(b) Ex post n case CV  
Personal you you 
cur 
1 I (16) ui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
-Δhi+Δhi)  
0 or 1 II 
(17) pui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi,hi
F
) = pui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
-Δhi+Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
) 
pre (18) pui
i
(yi,hi
F
-Δhi) + (1-p)ui
i
(yi,hi
F
) = ui
i
(yi-Δyi,hi
F
) 
Social ≠ you society cur 
n 1 (19) WI[u1…n(yj,hj
F
-Δhj); un+1…N(yj,hj
F
)] = W
I
[u1…n(yj-Δyj, hj
F
-Δhj+Δhj) + un+1…N(yj-Δyj,hj
F
)] 
(c) 
pN = n 2 (20) WI[u1…n(yj,hj
F
-Δhj); un+1…N(yj,hj
F
)] = W
I
[u1…n(yj-Δyj, hj
F
-Δhj+Δhj) + un+1…N(yj-Δyj,hj
F
)] 
(d) 
B(N,p) = n (e) 3 (21) 
W
I
 [pu1(y1,h1
F
-Δh1) + (1-p)u1(y1,h1
F), …, puN(yN,hN
F
-ΔhN) + (1-p)uN (yN,hN
F
)]  
= W
I
[u1…n(yj-Δyj, hj
F
-Δhj+Δhj) + un+1…N(yj-Δyj,hj
F
)] 
(4) 
0 or N 4 (22) 
pW
I
[u1…N(yj,hj
F
-Δhj)] + (1-p)W
I
[u1…N(yj,hj
F
)]  
= pW
I
[u1…N(yj-Δyj, hj
F
-Δhj+Δhj)] + (1-p)W
I
[u1…N(yj-Δyj,hj
F
)] 
a) See appendices for ex ante personal TTO, social TTO, and SIP CV 
b) cur/pre: curative or preventative; N: the population; n: actual number of patients = pN 
c) non-anonymous: the j subscripts identify unique individuals 
d) anonymous: the j subscripts represent interchangeable individuals 
e) B(N,p): binomial distribution with N trials and probability p, with mean of n 
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Appendices  
TTO scenario corresponding to (16): 
“Imagine you are about to develop condition X with certainty: what is the maximum number of 
years of life in full health that you can commit now to give up to ensure a complete cure in the 
future when you become ill and be no worse off than the current situation (not giving up life years 
and facing the condition)?”  [ex ante case I personal TTO: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
TTO scenario corresponding to (17) 
“Imagine you will develop condition X with probability p: what is the maximum number of years in 
full health that you can commit now to give up to ensure a complete cure in the future, and be no 
worse off than the current situation (not giving up life years and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case II  
personal TTO: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
Ex ante non-use CV based on (3) 
“Imagine a group of n people (not including you)will develop condition X with probability p (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you can pay for a complete cure in 
the future for those who will get X and be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex ante non-
use CV: user ≠ you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
Ex ante proxy CV based on (5) 
“Imagine a group of n people (not including you)will develop condition X with probability p (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you think they can pay for a 
complete cure in the future for themselves and be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex 
ante proxy CV: user ≠ you; user = payer ≠ you; assessor = you] 
TTO scenario corresponding to (19) based on (10) 
“Imagine a group of n already identified people is about to develop condition X with certainty: what 
do you think is the maximum number of years of life in full health that another group with the same 
number of people (m = n) might give up for a complete cure in the future for the first group and 
society to be no worse off than in the current situation?”  [ex ante case 1 subgroup social] 
TTO scenario corresponding to (20) based on (10) 
“Imagine proportion p of N people will develop condition X: what is the maximum number of years 
of life in full health that another group with the same number of people (m = n) might commit now 
to give up for a complete cure in the future and be no worse off than the current situation (not 
paying and facing the lottery)?”  [ex ante case 3 subgroup social] 
TTO scenario corresponding to (21) based on (10) 
“Imagine a group of n people will develop condition X each with independent probability p: what is 
the maximum number of years of life in full health that another group with the same number of 
people (m = n) might commit now to give up for a complete cure in the future for the first group and 
society to be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case 
2 subgroup social] 
TTO scenario corresponding to (22) 
“Imagine that with probability p everybody (N) will develop condition X; otherwise everybody will 
remain healthy: what is the maximum number of years of life in full health that everybody in this 
group might commit now to give up for a complete cure in the future and be no worse off than the 
current situation (not paying and facing the risk)?”  [ex ante case 4 social] 
